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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintiffTPetitioner, 
v. 
ERIC JARVIS WARREN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CaseNo.20020002-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and -(5) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the Court of Appeals1 opinion in State v. Warren« 2001 UT App 346, 37 
P.3d 270, is a legally sound decision, based on an analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, confirming that a frisk of Warren 
was not appropriate during a traffic stop where the searching officer testified that he did 
not believe Warren was armed and dangerous and where the facts do not otherwise 
establish a reasonable suspicion that Warren had access to weapons or posed a threat. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari review, the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
not of the trial court, is reviewed for correctness with no deference to its conclusions of 
law. See State v. James. 2000 UT 80, ^ [8,13 P.3d 576 (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
United States Constitution Amendment IV - Unreasonable Searches and 
Seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Eric Jarvis Warren ("Warren") was charged by information with two 
counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999); one count of carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-504 (1999); and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (Supp. 1999). R.14-16. 
Warren moved to suppress the evidence. R.43-44,47,49-56,130-31. He argued in 
part that the evidence was seized pursuant to an illegal frisk in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
R. 131 [8-10]. The trial court denied the suppression motion and entered findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. R.64-64,82-86. The trial court specifically concluded that, 
[t]he brief "Terry" frisk of defendant for weapons was not conducted in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Even though the officer stated he did 
not believe the defendant had weapons, the search was supported by an 
objective reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. 
The search was only conducted for officer safety and was supported by the 
following facts: the lateness of the hour, the area, no other traffic, no 
residences in area or open business, defendant's odd and inconsistent 
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explanation of his activities, officer[']s belief defendant was engaged in 
drugs and prostitution and that people who engage in such activity usually 
carry weapons, the officer was alone, the officer was going to impound 
defendant's vehicle, and defendant's previous false statement about the 
status of his license. 
R.84. 
Warren entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988); 
R. 100-07, 111. Warren appealed from the denial of the suppression motion. R. 112-13. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Warren's conviction on the basis that the 
frisk was illegal. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ffl[12-16. The State petitioned for 
certiorari review, which this Court granted in an order dated April 10, 2002. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Court of Appeals recited the following facts, which accurately reflect the 
evidence on the record: 
On November 28, 1999, at approximately 4:45 a.m., Officer Nathan 
Swensen observed a grey Cadillac pulled over to the side of the road near 
the intersection of 200 South and 200 East streets in downtown Salt Lake 
City. [R. 130:5.] Occupying the driver's seat of that vehicle was appellant 
Warren, a thirty-eight year old African American male. [R. 130:5]. Officer 
Swensen also observed another unidentified individual leaning into the 
front passenger's side door of Warren's car. [R. 130:5]. 
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Officer Swensen observed this activity for less than a minute, did not 
hear any of the conversation that took place, could not tell what the two 
people were doing, and did not recognize the vehicle or individuals from 
prior encounters. [R. 130:6,15]. Nonetheless, Officer Swensen assumed 
that Warren and the unidentified individual were engaged in a transaction 
involving either drugs or prostitution. [R. 130:6-7]. Officer Swensen 
testified that he based his suspicion on the fact that it was early in the 
morning and there were no open businesses or residences in the vicinity. 
[R. 130:6-7]. Despite his suspicions, Officer Warren did not then approach 
Warren's vehicle or the unidentified man, who departed on foot. [R. 130:6,16]. 
Officer Swensen then observed Warren pull away from the curb and 
make a left turn onto 200 South, followed by a lane change, without 
signaling. [R. 130:6]. Officer Swensen pulled Warren over after observing 
the traffic violation. [R. 130:7]. He requested Warren's driver's license and 
vehicle registration. [R.130: 8]. Warren readily provided the requested 
materials. [R. 130:8]. Officer Swensen noticed that the license had expired 
in 1995. [R.130:8]. Warren explained that he had a current license, but that 
it had been stolen. [R.130:8]. 
Officer Swensen then set about to ascertain why Warren was out at that 
time of night and what he had been doing with the unidentified man. 
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[R.130:9]. He asked questions regarding who the unidentified man was, 
what they were doing, and whether Warren had dropped the man off or just 
met him. [R. 130:9]. Warren responded by telling Officer Swensen that his 
mother and the man's mother were acquaintances and that he dropped the 
man off after they had been together at someone's house. [R. 130:9]. 
Warren also indicated that he had been looking for packing boxes for his 
sister, who was moving. [R. 130:9]. Officer Swensenfs questioning lasted 
approximately two minutes. [R. 130:18]. Officer Swensen conceded at the 
suppression hearing that these questions were unrelated to and unnecessary 
for the proper effectuation of the traffic stop. [R. 130:18]. 
Officer Swensen returned to his patrol car, checked Warren's license, 
and learned that it was otherwise current but had been suspended for failure 
to pay reinstatement fees. [R. 130:8-9]. Officer Swensen then decided to 
impound Warren's car. [R. 130:10]. He asked Warren to get out of the car 
to sign citations for failure to signal and for driving without a valid license. 
[R.130:10]. Officer Swensen testified he did not intend to arrest Warren 
and only had him exit the vehicle to inform him about the impound and to 
sign the citations. [R. 130:21-22]. 
When Warren was out of the car, Officer Swensen frisked him. 
[R. 130:10]. He did not believe that Warren was armed or dangerous, but 
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frisked him as a matter of routine. [R. 130:10,20]. A white plastic "twist," 
later identified as cocaine, fell from Warren's waist during the frisk, 
whereupon Warren was arrested. [R.84, 130:20-21]. An inventory search 
of Warren's car uncovered a knife concealed under the armrest, and a more 
in-depth search of Warren's person, incident to arrest, led to the discovery 
of more cocaine and a glass pipe. [R.84]. 
Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at 1HI2-7.1 
In addition, the officer testified that his reasons for the frisk were "[j]ust from 
training, and for my safety, and everybody that was there, their safety. Whenever I pull 
somebody out of a car, I perform a Terry frisk just to see if there's weapons. Also because 
of the fact that with there being drug activity and prostitution and so on, people that are 
involved in that usually carry weapons. So with that in mind, also for the fact that I 
always do that, perform that Terry frisk when I pull somebody out of a car, that's why I 
did it." R.130:10-ll. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Warren. 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 
270, correctly holds that the frisk of Warren was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. First, the searching officer testified that 
1
 Although quotes over fifty words are traditionally single-spaced in a brief, this 
quote has been double spaced for the ease of the reader. 
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he did not suspect Warren was armed and dangerous, and admitted that he only frisked 
him as a matter of routine because it was a traffic stop. Moreover, the Court of Appeals 
properly assessed the surrounding circumstances of the stop and determine that they did 
not otherwise support a reasonable suspicion that Warren posed a threat or was armed. 
Warren is in keeping with the appropriately narrow application of Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968), which allows protective frisks only upon an individualized 
suspicion that the person to be frisked is armed and dangerous. Lesser traffic offenses, 
such as the one involved in the present case, do not present inherently dangerous 
situations where a frisk is automatically justified absent other evidence to the contrary. 
Since additional evidence indicating that Warren was armed and dangerous did not exist 
in this case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the frisk was unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: STATE V, WARREN IS A LEGALLY SOUND DECISION, 
BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE. CORRECTLY HOLDING THAT A FRISK OF 
WARREN WAS NOT APPROPRIATE DURING A TRAFFIC STOP 
WHERE THE SEARCHING OFFICER TESTIFIED THAT HE DID NOT 
BELIEVE WARREN WAS ARMED AND DANGEROUS AND WHERE 
THE FACTS DO NOT OTHERWISE ESTABLISH A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THAT WARREN HAD ACCESS TO WEAPONS OR 
POSED A THREAT. 
A. The Court of Appeals Followed Fourth Amendment Case Law. 
The Court of Appeals properly followed Fourth Amendment case law in holding 
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that the frisk of Warren was not supported by a reasonable suspicion that he was armed 
and dangerous. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at Tfl6.2 As an initial matter, the 
decision is in accord with the fundamental precept that the decision to frisk be based on a 
particularized suspicion that the individual to be searched is armed and dangerous. The 
Court of Appeals, looking to Terry and quoting this Court's opinion in State v. Carter. 
707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985), properly noted that frisks are permissible only where the 
officer '"reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and dangerous .'" Warren, 
2001 UT App 346 at 1J13 (quoting Carter. 707 P.2d at 659; citing Terry. 392 U.S. 1) 
(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999) (statutory authorization for 
frisk). 
Terry holds under the Fourth Amendment that: 
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may 
2
 "On certiorari, we review the court of appeals1 decision for correctness. The 
correctness of the court of appeals1 decision depends [first] on whether it accurately 
reviewed the [lower court's] decision based on the appropriate standard of review." 
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational 
Fonds 2000 UT 57, |^9, 6 P.3d 559 (citing Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Div.. 
938 P.2d 266, 267-68 (Utah 1997). In this case, the Court of Appeals applied the correct 
bifurcated standard of review, applying a clear error standard to the facts and a 
correctness standard to the legal conclusions. See. Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^ 10. It 
is well-settled that this standard is applied to mixed questions of fact and law, such as the 
constitutionality of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. 
Chevre, 2000 UT App 6,1J6, 994 P.2d 1278 (applying bifurcated standard of review to 
question of legality of traffic stop); Statev.Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994) 
(same). 
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be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and 
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he 
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and 
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection 
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the 
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which 
might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under 
the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be 
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken. 
392 U.S. at 30-31; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999) (statutory authorization for 
Terry frisk). 
Terry further notes: 
[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the 
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be 
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Cf. 
Beckv. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 226, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 
(1964); Brine gar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 174-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 
1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Sta cev v. Emerv. 97 U.S. 642, 645, 24 L.Ed. 
1035 (1878). And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in 
such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,1 but to the specific reasonable 
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience. Cf Bnnegar[, 338 U.S. at 174-76.] 
Id, at 27. As with any Fourth Amendment analysis, reasonableness is the touchstone of 
the inquiry. See id at 19; Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977). 
Reasonableness depends upon the balance between the public interest in fighting crime 
and the individual's right to be free from unwarranted intrusion. See Mimms. 434 U.S. at 
109 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). 
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In light of Terry and the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals correctly 
recognized "two scenarios" that might give rise to a particularized suspicion that a person 
is armed and dangerous. First, "facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect 
and/or factual context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed, 
such as a suspect with a bulge in his clothing that appears to be a weapon or a suspect 
who is hesitant in denying that he is armed and aggressively approaches the officer 
immediately upon being stopped." Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^ 15 (citing State v. 
Rochelle. 850 P.2d 480,483 (Utah App. 1993)). 
The Court of Appeals properly noted that the frisk of Warren was not justified 
under this scenario because Officer Swensen himself testified that he did not think that 
Warren was armed and dangerous and that he only frisks as a matter of routine. Id. at 
[^16. This is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Ybarra v. Illinois . 444 
U.S. 85 (1979), wherein that Court stated, "[t]he 'narrow scope1 of the Terry exception 
does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than a reasonable belief of suspicion directed 
at the person to be frisked." Id. at 94 (emphasis added) (holding that a search of all bar 
patrons, including defendant, for drugs did not satisfy Fourth Amendment individualized 
suspicion requirement). If Officer Swensen himself did not believe that Warren was 
armed and dangerous, then the reasonable particularized suspicion requirement which 
lies at the heart of Terry and the Fourth Amendment is not present. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals correctly held that the frisk was not justified. 
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The Court of Appeals also noted the second scenario that might give rise to a 
legitimate Terry frisk, which occurs when the "inherent nature of the crime being 
investigated [] leads to the reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed." Warren, 
2001 UT App 346 at ^ [15. The Court, however, rejected that the frisk of Warren was 
justified under this prong as well. Id. at ffi[15-16. Citing Wayne R. LeFave, 4 Search 
and Seizure, § 9.5(a) at 252 (3rd ed. 1996), the Court of Appeals properly noted that 
"lesser traffic offenses1 are not suggestive of weapons. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 
at Tfl6 n.4. The court similarly noted that neither the suspected acts of prostitution or a 
small scale drug transaction, nor the "lateness of the hour" or "lying about the status of 
one's driver's license . . . suggested] the presence of weapons." Id. at 1J16 and n.4. 
Again, the Court of Appeals1 holding in this regard in consistent with case law. In 
Terry, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the frisk of the defendant was 
justified in part because the suspect was involved in a "daylight robbery - which, it is 
reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons." 392 U.S. at 28. 
By contrast, a minor traffic offense, in this case an illegal left turn and lane change 
without a signal, see Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^ 4, does not imply the presence of 
weapons. Indeed, there are a multitude of situations that arise daily in which a person 
might be stopped for a minor traffic violation but not otherwise be involved in activity 
that implied the presence of weapons or danger. These include taking kids to school, 
driving to work in the morning, or going to the grocery store. 
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For this reason, the Fourth Amendment requires "a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that the person may be armed and dangerous before a police officer may search 
a person who has been detained for a minor traffic infraction." Rhodes v. Com. 504 
S.E.2d 390, 394 (Va. App. 1998) (quotation omitted). Indeed, in Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms. 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court noted in dictum that a frisk of a 
person pulled over for a minor traffic offense (expired license plate) and asked to step 
out of the car was reasonable only because the officer observed a bulge in the suspect's 
jacket suggesting a weapon. See also United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 842 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (frisk justified where defendant kept right hand in pocket, "precisely where 
weapon could be located," even when he opened door and held beer can in other hand); 
United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (frisk justified where defendant's 
"moves took place after a detention, at night, in a high crime area where the carrying of 
weapons is common"). 
To this end, the Court of Appeals opinion correctly holds that reasonable 
suspicion of Warren was lacking and therefore the frisk was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. Warren also properly recognizes that Officer Swensen 
impermissibly acted off of "his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or fhunch,,M 
without any other reasonable indications that Warren was armed and dangerous. Terry, 
392 U.S. at 27 (citations omitted). Officer Swensen observed Warren, an African-
American male, driving a grey Cadillac. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at %2; R.130:5. 
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Warren's car was stopped and he was talking to an unidentified individual who was 
leaning into the passenger door of Warren's car. See. Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at %2; 
R. 130:5. Officer Swensen did not hear any of the conversation between the two people, 
and observed their activity for less than a minute. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at [^3; 
R. 130:6,15. He did not recognize either of the people and could not tell what they were 
doing. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at 1J3; R.130[6,15]. Officer Swensen "assumed" 
that they were involved in prostitution or a drug deal. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at 
f3; R. 130:6-7. He based his assumption on the fact that it was early in the morning and 
there were no open businesses in the area. See. Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at f3; 
R.130:6-7. 
Nonetheless, Officer Swensen did not approach Warren until a few minutes later 
when he observed Warren make a left turn and a lane change without signaling. See 
Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at f 3; R. 130:6-7. Swensen pulled Warren over and requested 
his license. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^ 4; R.130:8. Warren readily complied. 
See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^ 4; R.130:8. When Swensen discerned that the license 
was expired, Warren explained that he had a current one, but that it had been stolen. See 
Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at^4; R.130:8. 
Swensen asked Warren about the activity that he observed earlier. See Warren, 
2001 UT App 346 at ^ [5; R.130:9. Warren said that his mother and the man's mother 
were friends and that he dropped the man off after they were together at someone's 
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house. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at TJ5; R.130:9. Warren also said he was looking 
for packing boxes for his sister. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at TJ5; R.130:9. The 
questioning lasted two minutes, and Swensen conceded that it was not necessary to 
effectuate the traffic stop. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 atf5;R.130:18. 
Swensen returned to his patrol car to check Warren's license and learned that it 
was current but suspended for unpaid reinstatement fees. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 
at ^ [6; R. 130:8-9. Swensen decided to impound the car, but testified that he did not 
intend to arrest Warren. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at 1f6; R.130:10,21-22. Instead, 
he had Warren exit the car. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at f 6; R.130:10,21-22. He 
frisked Warren. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at Tf6; R.130:10. Swensen testified that 
he did not think Warren was armed, but that he did it as a matter of routine whenever he 
takes someone out of a car or suspects drug or prostitution activity. See Warren. 2001 
UTApp346at1f7andn.l;R.l30:l0-ll,20. 
In light of these facts, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that Swensen 
acted off mere "supposition that Warren and his unidentified companion were engaging 
in a transaction for either prostitution or drugs.11 IdL. at ^ }16. Given the Court of Appeals' 
consideration of all the facts, it did not overlook that traffic stops may be dangerous. 
Rather, it properly concluded that this was a minor traffic stop and, in light of the other 
evidence, there was not a reasonable suspicion that Warren was armed and dangerous. 
See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at ^ 16 and n.4. The mere fact of the traffic stop was not 
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enough to establish a reasonable fear that Warren was armed and dangerous, especially 
when Officer Swensen testified that he himself did not think that was the case. kL 
Ultimately, Warren should be affirmed because it preserves the appropriately 
narrow application of Terry and protects an individual's right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Since reasonableness is the touchstone of any 
Fourth Amendment analysis, it would be patently unreasonable to adopt a rule that all 
traffic stops are inherently dangerous and therefore a frisk is always justified in those 
situations. It "would mean that every motorist issued a citation for a minor traffic offense 
would enjoy no constitutional protection from a protective search for weapons." Simpler 
v. State, 568 A.2d 22, 26-27 (Md. 1990). "'Indeed, if everyone is assumed to be armed 
and dangerous until the officer is satisfied that he or she is not, then officers would be 
able to frisk at will - a result not contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.1 Thus, [the 
Fourth Amendment requires] a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person may be 
armed and dangerous before a police officer may search a person who has been detained 
for a minor traffic infraction." Rhodes v. Com. 504 S.E.2d 390, 394 (Va. App. 1998) 
(quotation omitted). 
The State relies primarily upon Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), and State v. James, 2000 UT 80, 13 P.3d 576, 
in support of its argument that traffic stops are inherently dangerous and therefore justify 
the frisk in this case. S.B.7. The State also cites statistics and an article from the Deseret 
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News (August 5, 2001) concerning the .anger that officers face during traffic stops. S.B. 
11 (Addendum A).3 The cases cited by the State are distinguishable from Warren and the 
statistics concerning officer safety do not change the fact that reasonable suspicion was 
not present in this case. 
First, Mimms, Wilson and James are all distinguishable because none of them 
involve situations where the individual was frisked, but rather lesser intrusions incident 
to traffic stops where the officers merely asked the driver / passenger to exit the car or 
opened a car door. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mimms held that an officer 
was justified in ordering the suspect out of his car after he was stopped for driving with 
an expired license plate. 434 U.S. at 107,111. The Court determined that this added 
intrusion above and beyond the traffic stop was a ""petty indignity"" considering that it 
only meant the difference between the individual sitting in the car and standing outside 
of it. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17). Such a minimal intrusion was reasonable 
"when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety." Id. at 111. The 
specific concerns for officer safety arose from the possibility that a suspect may have 
access to a weapon or may be able to make unobserved movements in a car, as well as 
the "hazard of accidental injury from passing traffic to an officer standing on the driver's 
side of the vehicle" which is avoided by asking the "driver... to step out of the car and 
off onto the shoulder of the road" where it is safer. Id. at 110-11. 
3
 The newspaper article that the State cites is not part of the appellate record. 
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The Mimms Court did not state that an officer may go ahead and frisk the 
individual as well, noting that the government was not making that argument on appeal. 
Id at 110 n.5. The defendant in that case was frisked. See 434 U.S. at 113 (discussed 
supra). The propriety of that frisk was not at issue, however. Id. at 109. The Court 
stated in dictum that the frisk was permissible only because a bulge in the suspect's jacket 
became apparent when the officer asked him to step out of the car. Id. at 107,111. Since 
the bulge suggested a weapon, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was 
armed, necessitating the frisk. Id at 111. Nothing in Mimms expresses or implies that 
the fact of the traffic stop alone justified the frisk. If anything, Mimms indicates that in 
ordinary traffic stops, absent other indications of a weapon, the precaution of asking a 
driver out of the car adequately addresses the officer's safety concerns. 
The U.S. Supreme Court extended its holding in Mimms to vehicle passengers in 
its subsequent Wilson opinion. 519 U.S. at 410. In that case, the driver was legitimately 
stopped for speeding and an expired registration tag. IJL After the driver voluntarily got 
out of the car, the officer asked the passenger to get out as well. Id. The passenger 
appeared sweaty and nervous. Id. at 410-11. A quantity of crack cocaine fell to the 
ground when the passenger exited. Id. at 411. The Court held that the officer was 
reasonable in asking the passenger to get out of the car because the safety concerns for 
the officer were the same. Id. at 414-15. Additionally, although a passenger has a 
greater liberty interest since he was not the one that committed the traffic violation, the 
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intrusion was still slight considering that a passenger has as much motive as the driver to 
"employ violence to avoid apprehension11 and the passenger was already stopped by 
virtue of the traffic stop. Id. at 414. As with Mimms, the Wilson opinion does not 
address frisks of individuals during traffic stops. 
Similarly, in James, this Court held that an officer may open a car door for 
purposes of investigating the driver within the context of a lawful stop for a traffic 
violation. 2000 UT App 80 at ffl[12-13. In that case, the officer received a report that the 
defendant was driving recklessly. Id. at ^|2. The officer stopped defendant's car in a 
driveway, but the defendant did not get out. Id. The officer saw two people in the car 
and opened the door and asked the defendant to exit. I JL at f3. This Court noted that the 
officer legally opened the door incidental to his lawful stop and investigation of the 
defendant. Id. at % 13. It was not an illegal, separate search of the car. Id. This Court 
cited Wilson and Mimms in recognizing the need for officer safety during traffic stops, 
and acknowledged that danger was inherent in this context. Id . at |^10 n.3. It did not, 
however, rule that the inherent danger of a traffic stop justified a frisk of the individual 
who was pulled from the car without further evidence of a firearm. See generally James, 
2000 UT 80 at ffl[8-13. 
Neither Mimms, Wilson, nor James justify a rule that traffic stops are inherently 
dangerous and therefore justify an automatic frisk of the individual. Their holdings 
cannot be stretched that far without eviscerating the protections of the Fourth 
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Amendment. At most, they set forth the proposition that safety concerns inhere in traffic 
stops, and for that reason the limited intrusions discussed in those cases are appropriate. 
It would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to allow for automatic frisks 
when these other protective options are available to an officer who stops someone for a 
moving violation. 
Indeed, a frisk of Warren or any individual stopped during a routine traffic stop, 
without other indicators leading to a reasonable suspicion of weapons, goes far beyond 
the Mde minimis" intrusion of asking a driver or passenger out of a car that is already 
legitimately stopped and cannot prevail when weighed against the interest in maintaining 
personal liberty. Mimms. 434 U.S. at 111. In Knowles v. Iowa. 525 U.S. 113 (1998), 
the Supreme Court held that an officer could not even search the inside of a vehicle after 
he had stopped and cited the driver for speeding. Id. at 114. The Court recognized the 
need for officer safety during traffic stops, stating, 
[t]his is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of 
a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. But while the concern for officer 
safety in this context may justify the "minimal11 additional intrusion of 
ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify 
the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type search. 
Id at 117 (citing Mimms. 434 U.S. at 111; Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414). It follows from 
Knowles that a search of an individual's person is impermissible during a traffic stop 
without other factors giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he or she is armed and 
dangerous. One's person is even more sacrosanct than the interior of their car. A bodily 
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frisk, therefore, involves an even greater intrusion than the impermissible search of the 
car at issue in Knowles. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly decided that the 
frisk of Warren was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where the officer 
testified that he did not suspect Warren was armed or dangerous and where the 
circumstances did not otherwise reasonably suggest the presence of weapons. See 
Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^16. 
B. The Court of Appeals Gave Due Consideration to the Totality of the 
Circumstances. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the Warren opinion is properly based on an 
analysis of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Arvizu. 122 S.Ct. 744, 
751 (2002) (holding that reasonableness of search under Fourth Amendment must be 
based on analysis of totality of circumstances). First, the opinion is premised on Terry, 
the touchstone of which is a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. See 2001 UT App 
346 at 11[13-16; see also Terry 392 U.S. at 9 (n[t]he question is whether in all the 
circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, [defendant's] right to personal security was 
violated by an unreasonable search and seizure11) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court 
of Appeals begins its discussion by referencing the fact-specific nature of the inquiry: 
11
 [although f[i]t is not essential that an officer actually have been in fear1 to perform a 
Terry frisk, the State must present articulable facts that would reasonably lead an 
objective officer to conclude that the suspect may be armed." Warren. 2001 UT App 346 
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i il f 14 (quoting State v. Cartel ; 0 71 :i" 2d 656, 6:59 (I Jtal i 1985)) (emphasis added). 
Conseqi lei ill) , n>nlr?m In (lit; Slnlc's nsscrlnini lln1 illiil ilih, an il1 -as is "in K'rukvd" h linn1 
Court of Appeals. S.B. 8. 
More than just being referenced, the totality analysis is actually applied in Warren. 
The Court of Appeals noted the searching officer's inchoate "supposition" that "Warren 
and his unidentified companion were engaging in a transaction for either prostitution or 
drugs ' \\ arrciu 20111 Ml <\pp Urn ill ^llh lln I uiiiift n Ininll in S^CIIM iir Mr.piuun a. 
"supposition" because he only observed Warren and the unidentified individual together 
"for less than a minute, did not hear any of the conversation that took place, and could 
not tell what the two people were doing, and did not recognize the vehicle or individuals 
fi om prior encounters (ill, al "l llso nnlnl Ilia! liii/ uffu IT admitted' Ihal "li ' did not 
believe Warren was armed at the time he decided to frisk him." IdL. Based on these facts, 
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the officer lacked individualized suspicion 
that Warren was armed and dangerous as required by Terry, 5{Kl 1 S. all I See Warren, 
2001 l l'l App 34'f"t a) ^|l(\' sec supra (di^uissini.' legal siipp<m \\w Court ol Appi'*il.s' 
decision). 
The Court of Appeals considered the other factors of Warren's case as well, 
concluding that the situation itself did not support a reasonable suspicion that Warren 
^ as aiiiicii ami daiif.a 11HIS ;>IV ,001 I I I 'ipp \h Jl ]\U\ I irai lhr oaiiiill notn! lli.it 
"'lesser traffic offenses1" such as the one involved in this case (a stop for an illegal lane 
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change and turning without a signal) "are not suggestive of weapons." Id. at ^ [16 n.4 
(quoting Wayne R. LeFave, 4 Search and Seizure, §9.5(a) at 256 (3rd ed. 1996)). The 
Court of Appeals also considered the "lateness of the hour" (4:45 a.m.) and the fact that 
Warren "lied about the status of [his] driver's license," but concluded that they did not 
suggest the presence of weapons without other evidence to support it. Id_; see infra 
(discussing legal support for Court of Appeals1 decision). 
The full and appropriate consideration of the facts in Warren distinguishes it from 
Arvizu, where the lower court, reversed on appeal, expressly excluded or isolated certain 
factors in its consideration of the reasonableness of the search at issue there. See 122 
S.Ct. at 750. There, an officer observed the defendant driving along a desolate desert 
backroad in southeast Arizona, an area known for drug trafficking. IdL at 748-49. The 
defendant drove a minivan, which the officer knew in his experience to be the sort of 
vehicle used by smugglers. Id at 749. The van slowed significantly as it approached the 
officer's patrol car. Id. The driver in the van (defendant) did not look over at the officer 
as he passed, and his posture appeared stiff and rigid as he drove. IdL The officer 
observed two children sitting in the back of the van with their knees unusually high, "as 
if their feet were propped up on some cargo on the floor." Id. 
The officer followed the van. Id. The children put their hands up at the same time 
and waved at him "in an abnormal partem . . . as if they were being instructed" for four to 
five minutes. Id The driver made an abrupt turn-off at the last possible place to avoid a 
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known du.'ck poml in (IIIIK: MV\I M. I In: oUiier \illa! in llic U'I-MSIMIH n on llie sail and 
traced it to an address jusl imr irtlh rill llir h , nlrrbotwmi MCMU O .iml thr 1 hnilcd Slnlcs in 
an area known for narcotics trafficking. Id. The officer stopped ihc \ an and asked the 
defendant if he could search it. Id. Defendant agreed. Id. The officer located marijuana 
in a linftk hay IIJKK I llic Uiiklu'ii's led,, and nunc m another bag in the rear of the van. 
I In Ninth ( in in! i nnrl ml \ppiMl In lil lli.il lln hip l\ m i nul ha i d ii| nil 
reasonable suspicion, noting that 
fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests 
introduced Ma troubling degree of uncertainty and unpredictability" into the 
Fourth Amendment analysis. It therefore "attempted] to describe and 
clearly delimit the extent to which certain factors may be considered by law 
enforcement officers in making stops,, . , After characterizing the District 
Court's analysis as relying on a list of 10 factors, the Court of Appeals 
proceeded to examine each in turn. It held that 7 of the factors, including 
respondent's slowing down, his failure to acknowledge [the officer], the 
raised position of the children's knees, and their odd waving carried little or 
no weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus. The remaining factors - the 
road's use by smugglers, the temporal proximity between [defendant's] trip 
and the agents' shift change, and the use of mini vans by smugglers - were 
not enough to render the stop permissible. 
Id at 750, 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, reasoning that the lower 
C 0 U If s "rejection of se\ en of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take 
Hindi iHYiinnf the "Mfilil", .^ lli,,,., . ii.'mnstmnvs,1 ,TI OIU rus js h.m nndcrsl vnl tli.it phi,1st1 " 
23 
Id at 751. Although each factor could be "innocent in itself," they could amount to 
reasonable suspicion in the aggregate. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). Moreover, a 
totality analysis gives proper weight to an officer's "own experience and specialized 
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information 
available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.1" Id. (citing Ornelas v. 
United States. 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). 
The Court of Appeals in Warren did not attempt to "'delimit1 an officer's 
consideration of certain factors" in its analysis as occurred in Arvizu. See Arvizu, 122 
S.Ct. at 751; see Warren, 2001 UT 346 at ffi[12-16. Nor did it reject any particular factor 
or consider it in isolation from the others. Id. Rather, the Court of Appeals properly 
concluded, based on an assessment of all the facts of the case, that without more the 
traffic stop at issue here did not reasonably suggest the presence of a weapon sufficient to 
justify the frisk that occurred. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Warren respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Warren since the decision is properly based on an 
analysis of the totality of the circumstances and squares with Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. As such, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the frisk of Warren was 
not justified by reasonable suspicion where the officer testified that he did not suspect 
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\\ arren po^cil a lineal .mil lln.1 ciicuiiislain.es did nul nlliciwise suggest that he was armed 
and dangerous. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Eric i m i w AKh'l N ndt/ndai«« "««<' ' P(» " int. 
No. 20000495-CA. 
Nov.,, 16,2001 
Defendant was convicted in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Sheila K. McCleve, J., of 
possession of a controlled substance. Defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: 
(1) police officer did not have any reasonable 
suspicion that defendant, who was cited for traffic 
violations, was armed to justify Terry frisk, and (2) 
remand to trial court was not appropriate to 
determine if seizure of cocaine and drug 
paraphernalia from defendant was justified under 
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule. 
* V \ i T M ' P if.." • • : - • • 1 
Thorne, Jr., J., concurred in part, dissented in part, 
and filed an opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[I] Criminal Law €=>H34(3) 
110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases 
t ' riminal Law ^~•'! \*M i > 
-1 ( rmim-at L;i* *>-' 1 ?58t4l 
i lUKi f:;8i4) Most Cited Cases 
The factual findings underlying a ti ial court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-
erroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness, with a measure of 
discretion given to the trial judge's application of 
the legal standard to the facts. 
|2| Arrest €=»63.5(8) 
j5kt>3.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
Where a police officer \ alidly stops ai i individual 
for investigatory or other purposes and reasonably 
believes that the individual may be armed and 
dangerous, the officer may conduct a frisk or 
pat-down search of the individual to discover 
weapons that might be used against h-v. '• ^ 
Const.Amend. 4 
|3J Arrest €=>63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
Although it is not essential that an officer actually 
have been in fear to perform a Terry frisk, the State 
must present articulable facts that would reasonably 
lead an objective officer to conclude that the 
suspect may be armed; a mere unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch is not sufficient. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4, 
[41 Arrest o~'oJ.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
Facts and circumstances unique to the particulai 
suspect and/or factual contextmay give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed to 
warrant a Terry frisk, such as a suspect with a 
bulge in his clothing that appears to be a weapon or 
a suspect who is hesitant in denying that he is armed 
and aggressively approaches the officer 
immediately upon being stopped U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend, 4 
[5| Arrest €=>63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
If the inherent nature o« w . uiie being 
investigated leads an officer t. a reasonable 
suspicion that a suspect may be armed, a Terry frisk 
may be warranted. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[6] Arrest €==>63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
Only where there is a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity and the nature of the crime 
suggests an increased likelihood that the suspect is 
armed can a frisk be justified. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
, ! \,jtomobiles€=>349.5(10) 
4bAk 349.5(10) Most Cited Cases 
Police officer did. not have any reasonable suspicion 
Copr. © West 2002 No CJaim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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that defendant, who was cited for traffic violations, 
was armed to justify Terry frisk, where officer 
testified at suppression hearing that he did not 
believe defendant was armed at time he decided to 
frisk defendant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[8] Criminal Law €=>394.1(3) 
110k394.1(3) Most Cited Cases 
[8] Criminal Law €=>394.6(4) 
110k394.6(4) Most Cited Cases 
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the 
exclusionary rule; however, under the inevitable 
discovery doctrine, State has the burden to establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately would have been discovered 
by lawful means. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4 
[9] Criminal Law €==>H81.5(7) 
1 lOkl 181.5(7) Most Cited Cases 
Remand to trial court was not appropriate to 
determine if seizure of cocaine and drug 
paraphernalia from defendant was justified under 
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule; 
no evidence in record could have sustained findings 
that police would have inevitably discovered 
cocaine and paraphernalia. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
4. 
*271 Catherine E. Lilly, Otis Sterling, III, and 
Heather Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Marian Decker, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before JACKSON, Associate P.J., and ORME and 
THORNE, Jr., JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
1f 1 Appellant Eric Jarvis Warren seeks to 
overturn his conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(Supp.1999). Specifically, he contends the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
evidence he alleges was seized in violation of his 
i a g e J U I O 
Page 2 
Fourth Amendment rights. Warren argues that the 
evidence obtained from the police officer's search 
should have been suppressed because, inter alia, he 
was illegally frisked. The State counters with, 
among other things, the claim that the evidence 
would inevitably have been discovered. We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
T| 2 "Because a determination of the 
reasonableness of... police conduct is highly factual 
in nature, we review the facts in detail." State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 86 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). On 
November 28, 1999, at approximately 4:45 a.m., 
Officer Nathan Swensen observed a grey Cadillac 
pulled over to the side of the road near the 
intersection of 200 South and 200 East streets in 
downtown Salt Lake City. Occupying the driver's 
seat of that vehicle was appellant Warren, a 
thirty-eight year old African-American male. 
Officer Swensen also observed another unidentified 
individual leaning into the front passenger's side 
door of Warren's car. 
| 3 Officer Swensen observed this activity for less 
than a minute, did not hear any of the conversation 
that took place, could not tell what the two people 
were doing, and did not recognize the vehicle or 
individuals from prior encounters. Nonetheless, 
Officer Swensen assumed that Warren and the 
unidentified individual were engaged in a 
transaction involving either drugs or prostitution. 
Officer Swensen testified that he based his 
suspicion on the fact that it was early in the morning 
and there were no open businesses or residences in 
the vicinity. Despite his suspicions, Officer 
Swensen did not then approach Warren's vehicle or 
the unidentified man, who departed on foot. 
f 4 Officer Swensen then observed Warren pull 
away from the curb and make a left turn onto 200 
South, followed by a lane change, without signaling. 
Officer Swensen pulled Warren over after 
observing the traffic violation. He requested 
Warren's driver's license and vehicle registration. 
Warren readily provided the requested materials. 
Officer Swensen noticed that the license had 
expired in 1995. Warren explained that he had a 
current license, but that it had been stolen. 
\ 5 Officer Swensen then set about to ascertain 
why Warren was out at that time of night and what 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
* ~&~ 
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t le ! lad been, doing with the unidentified man. I le 
asked questions regarding who the unidentified man 
was, what they were doing, and whether Warren had 
dropped the man off or just met him. Warren 
responded by telling Officer Swensen that his 
mother and the man's mother were acquaintances 
and that he dropped the man off after they had been 
together at someone's house. Warren also 
indicated that he had been looking for packing 
boxes for his sister, who was moving. Officer 
Swensen's questioning lasted approximately two 
minutes. Officer Swensen conceded at the 
suppression hearing that these questions were 
unrelated to and unnecessary for the proper 
effectuation of tl ic traffic stop, 
*272 K 6 Officer Swensen returned to his patrol 
car, checked Warren's license, and learned that it 
was otherwise current but had been suspended for 
failure to pay reinstatement fees. Officer Swensen 
then decided to impound Warren's car. He asked 
Warren to get out of the car to sign citations for 
failure to signal and for driving without a valid 
license. Officer Swensen testified he did not intend 
to arrest Warren and only had him exit the vehicle 
to inform him about the impound and to sign, the 
citations 
K 7 When Warren was out of the car, Officer 
Swensen frisked him. He did not believe that 
Warren was armed or dangerous, but frisked him as 
a matter of routine. [FN1] A white plastic "twist," 
later identified as cocaine, fell from Warren's waist 
during the frisk, whereupon Warren was arrested. 
An inventory search of Warren's car uncovered a 
knife concealed under the armrest, and a more 
in-depth search of Warren's person, incident to 
arrest, led to the discovery of more cocaine and a 
glass pipe, 
FN1. In fact, when asked, the officer 
testified that his reasons for the frisk were 
"[j]ust from training, and for my safety, 
and everybody that was there, their safety. 
Whenever I pull somebody out of a car, I 
perform a Terry frisk just to see if there's 
weapons. Also because of the fact that with 
there being drug activity and prostitution 
and so on, people that are involved in that 
usually carry weapons. So with that in 
mind, also for the fact that I always do 
Copr. ©V - ' "'•( ' \ . 
P.i-e 
;r;;L p>.:uv
 x ihai ; v-rr> ! n 4 >.\v . J 
homebod\ . : j ; of a <u: ' hu ts \w \ I J.d .• " 
j^ g Warren
 m o v e c | t 0 S Upp r e s s the cocaine and 
pipe as evidence, claiming (1) that the scope of the 
detention and questioning went beyond the purpose 
of the traffic stop and (2) that the frisk was not 
justified by a reasonable suspicion that he was 
armed. The trial court denied the motion, 
concluding that the questioning was reasonable 
given the officer's personal observations and 
resulting suspicion. The court also ruled that the 
frisk was justified by the officer's legitimate concern 
for his safety. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
*i V : 1\L ;
 SM.V\; presented in this appeal are 
whether ihc trial court, in denying appellant's 
motion to suppress, correctly determined that (1) 
Officer Swensen properly extended the scope of the 
traffic stop beyond its original purpose and (2) the 
officer's search of Warren did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
[1] K 10 "The 'factual findings underlying a. tt ial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are reviewed under the 
deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts." State 
v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct App/), 
cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996), 
% 11 The State argues that even if the actions of 
Officer Swensen violated Warren's Fourth 
Amendment rights, the case should be remanded to 
the trial court to determine if the evidence acquired 
from the investigation should nonetheless be 
admitted because it would inevitably have been 
discovered. 
1 LEGALITY OF FRISK 
Warren argues that the evidence obtained 
iivm his person was inadmissible at trial because he 
was frisked absent any reasonable suspicion that he 
was armed. He points out that at the suppression 
hearing Officer Swensen testified he did not believe 
Warren to be armed at the time he decided to frisk 
him. The State insists that Officer Swensen's 
X C i g , V *J V / l U 
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search of Warren was objectively reasonable under 
the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), 
"[g]iven the circumstances of the traffic stop, 
including the deserted downtown area at an 
unusually early hour, defendant's lie about the 
validity of his license, and recognition that traffic 
stops are inherently dangerous." [FN2] 
FN2. Apparently recognizing the lack of 
any articulable facts that would reasonably 
lead to an inference that Warren and his 
acquaintance were engaged in a drug or 
prostitution transaction, the State on appeal 
does not seriously press this angle as a 
basis for suspecting Warren was armed. 
[2] K 13 The State's argument reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the Terry *273 
holding, which is not nearly as open-ended as the 
State seems to suggest. 
In Terry, the Supreme Court established a 
narrowly drawn exception to the Fourth 
Amendment requirement that police obtain a 
warrant for all searches. Where a police officer 
validly stops an individual for investigatory or 
other purposes and reasonably believes that the 
individual may be armed and dangerous, the 
officer may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down 
search of the individual to discover weapons that 
might be used against him. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985) 
(emphasis added). 
[3] % 14 Although "[i]t is not essential that an 
officer actually have been in fear" to perform a 
Terry frisk, the State must present articulable facts 
that would reasonably lead an objective officer to 
conclude that the suspect may be armed. Id. "A 
mere unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not 
sufficient." Id. 
[4][5][6] K 15 Two basic scenarios may warrant a 
Terry frisk. In the first, facts and circumstances 
unique to the particular suspect and/or factual 
context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the 
suspect may be armed, such as a suspect with a 
bulge in his clothing that appears to be a weapon or 
a suspect who is hesitant in denying that he is armed 
and aggressively approaches the officer 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim 
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immediately upon being stopped. See State v. 
Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah Ct.App.1993); 
Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a), 
at 252, 257 (3rd ed.1996). In the second scenario, 
it is not so much the peculiarities of the suspect and 
circumstances as it is the inherent nature of the 
crime being investigated that leads to the reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect may be armed. The 
leading treatise on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence explains that while it may be 
reasonable for an officer to frisk a suspect who has 
been stopped based upon a suspicion that he is 
engaging in criminal activity for which an offender 
would likely be armed, it does not follow that 
officers are free to frisk any individual suspected of 
any crime. [FN3] See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search 
and Seizure, § 9.5(a), at 254-59 (3rd ed.1996). 
Crimes that, by their nature, suggest the presence of 
weapons include: "robbery, burglary, rape, assault 
with weapons, homicide, and dealing in large 
quantities of narcotics." Id. at 255-56 (footnotes 
omitted). "But for other types of crimes, such as 
trafficking in small quantities of narcotics, 
possession of marijuana, illegal possession of 
liquor, prostitution, bookmaking, shoplifting, 
underage drinking, driving under the influence and 
lesser traffic offenses, minor assault without 
weapons, or vagrancy," there must be particular 
facts which lead the officer to believe that a suspect 
is armed. Id. at 256-57 (footnotes omitted). 
FN3. This court has expressed an 
unwillingness to characterize a frisk as 
justified where the possibility of a crime 
being committed is speculative at best and 
the officer's suspicions do "not generally 
implicate an inherently dangerous situation 
or specifically indicate that the suspect [is] 
armed." State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 
663-66 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (holding that 
"unfounded allegations of attenuated 
domestic violence" and suspicion of 
cocaine use did not justify an immediate 
frisk). Only where there is a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity and the 
nature of the crime suggests an increased 
likelihood that the suspect is armed can a 
frisk be justified. See id; State v. Carter, 
707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) 
(authorizing the frisk of a burglary suspect 
who matched a police radio description 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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because an officer could reasonably 
conclude that a burglary suspect might be 
carrying dangerous tools or weapons); 
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 
(Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) 
(explaining that Terry frisk of suspect 
reasonably believed to be involved in 
moving large quantities of illegal drugs 
over long distances was justified). 
[7] 1 16 Beyond his supposition that Warren and 
his unidentified companion were engaging in a 
transaction for either prostitution or drugs, Officer 
Swensen did not provide the trial court with any 
facts that justified a Terry frisk. The fact that 
Officer Swensen candidly admitted at the 
suppression hearing that he did not believe Warren 
was armed at the time he decided to frisk him 
clearly takes Officer Swensen's actions outside of 
Terry's limited justification for warrantless searches. 
Nor do the facts urged by the State on appeal to 
rationalize the frisk furnish the required foundation. 
[FN4] We therefore conclude *274 that the search 
violated Warren's Fourth Amendment rights, and 
the. evidence obtained thereby should have been 
suppressed. [FN5] 
FN4. See 1 12, supra. As noted, "iessei 
traffic offenses" are not suggestive of 
weapons. Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search 
and Seizure, § 9.5(a), at 256 (3rd 
ed.1996). Nor is the lateness of the hour. 
See id. at 260. Similarly, lying about the 
status of one's driver's license does not 
suggest the presence of weapons. 
FN5. Having concluded that the evidence 
obtained should have been suppressed due 
to the unlawful frisk, we need not address 
whether Officer Swensen also violated 
Warren's rights by impermissibly 
extending his questioning beyond the 
scope of the traffic stop. 
; HVITABLE DISCOVERY 
.>, * . . i .JC btate argues that even if the search 
was unlaw iul, this case should be remanded to the 
trial court to determine if the seizure of cocaine and 
paraphernalia from Warren's person was 
nonetheless justified under the "inevitable 
discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule. 
"Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the 
exclusionary rule[.]" State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT 
App 311,1 10, 14 P.3d 695,, However, under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, the State has the 
burden to " 'establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the information ultimately would have 
been discovered by lawful means.' " Id. (quoting 
State v. James, 2000 UT 80,1 16, 13 P.3d 576). 
[9] *f 18 li i making its argument, the State 
correctly points out that the trial court did not make 
findings of fact addressing this issue. The State 
argues the trial court should have the opportunity to 
do so now. However, in so arguing the State fails 
to recognize that this lack of findings relevant to 
inevitable discovery was not due to some lapse or 
oversight by the trial court, or even to a mistake of 
law. Rather, the State failed to timely advance the 
theory or present evidence to support it. 
1 19 Altl lough tl le State bore tl ie burdei i of 
proving that the evidence would inevitably 1ia\e 
been discovered by lawful means, not one word 
about inevitable discovery was mentioned during 
the suppression hearing itself. No evidence in 
contemplation of that theory was introduced by the 
State, nor was it mentioned in the brief oral 
argument that concluded the hearing. Rather, the 
idea surfaced for the first time only in subsequent 
briefing and a later round of oral arguments when it 
was raised, with apologies for its untimeliness, by a 
different prosecutor than the one who handled the 
actual suppression hearing. 
1 20 Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in 
the record that would sustain findings in support of 
a determination that discovery of the drugs and 
paraphernalia on Warren's person would have been 
inevitable, along the lines theorized by the State on 
appeal, even had he not been frisked. Although the 
arresting officer did testily that he impounded 
Warren's car, there was no testimony that, following 
such impoundment, an inventory search of the 
vehicle would have been made. No testimony 
established the procedure, scope, and criteria of 
such a search, in accordance with preestablished 
departmental guidelines, so that the legality of such 
a search could be gauged. See generally State v. 
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Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426-27 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). The record contains no evidence 
showing that such a search would have uncovered 
the knife, much less that such discovery would have 
prompted further immediate contact with Warren. 
There was no testimony that the officers would have 
been able to quickly locate Warren after 
discovering the weapon, or that he still would have 
had narcotics and paraphernalia on his person at the 
time of any such later encounter. 
% 21 Because no evidence in the record would 
support findings establishing inevitable discovery, 
remand would be a meaningless gesture that should 
be avoided in the interest of judicial economy. In 
State v. Hagen, 802 P.2d 745 (Utah Ct.App.1990), 
rev'd on other grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992), 
affd, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S.Ct. 958, 127 L.Ed.2d 252 
(1994), we explained that a remand is not 
appropriate where "there is simply no way [the] 
evidence [can] be 'weighed' by the trial court to 
come to the conclusion that the state [has] met its 
burden." Id. at 747. As in Hagen, there is no way 
in this case that the trial court, lacking any relevant 
evidence, could properly determine that the *275 
police would have inevitably discovered the cocaine 
and pipe. See id. 
CONCLUSION 
K 22 Because when Officer Swensen frisked 
Warren he did not believe, and had no basis on 
which to reasonably conclude, that Warren might be 
armed, the frisk was unlawful. The evidence 
procured as a result of that frisk must be 
suppressed. Further, because the State failed to 
meet its burden to establish the discovery of the 
evidence was inevitable, that theory has long since 
been foreclosed. Remand for consideration of that 
theory's applicability at this late date cannot be 
justified in the complete absence of any evidence 
addressing inevitable discovery. Accordingly, we 
reverse and remand for a new trial or such other 
proceedings as may now be appropriate. 
U 23 I CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
THORNE, Jr., Judge (concurring in part, dissenting 
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in part): 
\ 24 I concur with the principle portion of the 
majority's opinion, however, I feel that deciding the 
issue of inevitable discovery at this level without 
permitting the trial court the opportunity to consider 
it is unwise. 
t 25 I agree that the record presented to this court 
is insufficient on its face to support a conclusion of 
"inevitable discovery." However, I disagree with 
the decision to foreclose any further examination of 
this issue in the name of "judicial economy," 
particularly since, as the majority points out, it was 
not addressed below. The majority seems intent on 
establishing an ill conceived rule requiring the state 
to raise every possible argument in response to a 
motion to suppress. The majority would foreclose 
the possibility for additional evidence and 
additional argument directed at this specific 
question under the belief that the prosecution has 
had an opportunity to present such an issue, but 
chose not to, thereby surrendering the option to ever 
raise it again. 
\ 26 In my experience, the question of "inevitable 
discovery" is often not ripe for discussion until and 
unless the trial court concludes that a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Further, until 
a trial court has reached such a conclusion, 
requiring such an effort would waste valuable 
resources for the parties and the trial courts. 
\ 27 I believe both wisdom and precedent support 
a more balanced approach permitting further 
exploration of questions like "inevitable discovery" 
after a trial court has determined that the Fourth 
Amendment has been violated. See Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 543, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 
2536, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (vacating the 
judgment and remanding the case for further 
hearings on the issue of the "independent source" 
doctrine, which had not been previously addressed); 
State v. Wagoner, 126 N.M. 9, 966 P.2d 176, 
(Ct.App.1998) (stating "[T]he district court made 
no findings, oral or written, regarding these issues. 
When the prosecutor began to argue for application 
of the inevitable-discovery exception, the district 
court cut him off by expressing its disapproval of 
the exception. Consequently, we must remand to 
the district court to determine whether the inevitable 
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discovery exception applies to ts. cisc }. >vv 'J .>;; 
other grounds, 130 N.M • i' : . -^  
(Ct.App.2001). [FN1] 
FN!. If the trial court properly determines 
that the search did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, it would be wasted effort to 
also require that the court take evidence 
and make findings concerning inevitable 
discovery at the same time. 
11 28 Moreover, I also disagree with tl ic majority's 
foray into findings of fact concerning this issue 
following our admission that the record is 
insufficient to fully address the issue. I believe that 
it is not our role to make findings of fact, and absent 
a proper finding of fact "application of the proper 
rule of law is difficult, if not impossible, and the 
reviewing function of this court is seriously 
undermined." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1339 (Utah 1*= 'o :. 
\ 29 Accordingly, I make no judgment as to tlie 
ultimate determination of whether the evidence in 
this particular matter would have inevitably been 
discovered, but I would permit the trial court to 
receive additional evidence *276 and hear 
additional argument on the question. Moreover, I 
do not believe the majority is correct in stating that 
"remand would be a meaningless gesture that 
should be avoided in the interest of judicial 
economy." Therefore I dissent. 
37 p.3d 270, 434 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 200! U I App 
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